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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
ALFRED ROGER l\IOORE,

Respondent,
vs.
Case No.

DEKVER & RIO GRANDE
\YESTER~
RAILROAD C 0 M P AXY, a corporation,

8284

THE

Appellant.

I
•

J

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Plaintiff's statement of fact is in large part inexact
and misleading. Rather than point out the inaccuracy of
numerous statements of counsel and the misleading effect
of quotations isolated from context found throughout the
Brief of Respondent, we solicit the close attention of the
court to the medical and lay testimony contained in the
record which we feel when read in context will fully support appellant's argument.
We are convinced, however, that a reply is warranted
and would be helpful to the court in view of plaintiff's
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argument of the points involved and particularly counsel's
skillful citation of authorities which have no bearing here,
but which are made to appear to be in point.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN FAILING TO GIVE APPELLANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 16.
(a)

The evidence is insufficient to show the existence of a disc injury.

(b)

The evidence is not sufficient to show a
causal connection between the accident and
the alleged disc injury.
POINT II.

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN GIVING INSTRUCTION
NO. 12.
POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 13.
POINT IV.
T·HE JURY'S VERDICT WAS SO EXCESSIVE
UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS
CASE AS TO INDICATE THAT· THE JURY
WAS INFLUENCED BY PASSION AND PREJUDICE.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN FAILING TO GIVE APPELLANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 16.
(a)

The evidence is insufficient to show the existence of a disc injury.

By its Point No. 1 defendant contends that the evidence
is not sufficient to show that a disc injury was. caused by
the incident of August 9, 1951. We argued that plaintiff's
evidence was not sufficient unless it demonstrated to a
"reasonable certainty" the nature and cause of the alleged
injury.
Counsel for plaintiff urge that the "reasonable certainty" rule (which appears to be common to other jurisdictions) has been expressly repudiated in Utah. To support their contention the cases of Picino v. Utah-Apex
Mining Co., 52 Utah 338, 173 Pac. 900 and Kirchgestner v.
The Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Company, 118
Utah 20, 218 P. 2d 685 are cited. Those cases dealt with
proof of "future pain and suffering." Proof of the nature
and cause of an alleged existing injury understandably presents a different problem. The Arizona Court recognized
the distinction in Coppinger v. Broderick, 37 Ariz. 473, 295
Pac. 780, where it was said:

"* * * The apprehended future consequences
of an injury * * * from their very nature
* * * must be measured by a rule more or less
flexible."
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The degree of proof required to show alleged existing damages was properly stated in Telluride Power Co. v. Williams,
172 F'. 2d 673, (lOth Cir. 1949). On appeal from the district
court of Utah the court of appeals said:
"Damages are not recoverable unless they are
clearly ascertainable both in their nature and origin,
and unless it is also so established that they are the
natural and proximate consequence of the breach
and are not contingent or speculative."
See also United States v. Griffith, Gornall and Carman, Inc.,
210 F. 2d 11, (lOth Cir. 1954), (damages must be shown
to a "reasonable certainty").
Even assuming the rule in the Picino and Kirchgestner
cases relating to proof of future damages to be applicable
here, plaintiff's proof falls short of that required. Those
cases ruled that damages for future pain and suffering that
plaintiff "will probably endure" may be recovered. In explaining its position the court said in the Picino case:
"We think there is a clear distinction between
that which 'may happen' and that which 'will probably happen.' The former may imply a mere possibility, while the latter implies that which is likely
to happen."
The differentiation between "probable" and "possible" in
the Picino case clearly indicates the insufficiency of plaintiff's evidence which does not go beyond proof of a mere
''possibility."
Counsel for plaintiff next cite Jackson v. Harries, 65
Utah 282, 236 Pac. 234, urging that the speculative testimony of Doctor Clegg was admissible in evidence. As to
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this appeal the question of admissibility is moot. We have
argued that even assuming the admissibility of the questioned portions of Doctor Clegg's testimony the evidence
is not sufficient to justify a finding of a disc injury.
The Jackson case dealt with the admissibility of medical evidence relating to causal connection. Unlike the instant case the condition from which plaintiff was suffering had been clearly established. The decision, holding that
the trial court had not erred in allowing testimony that
the condition "could have" been caused by defendant's
vvTrongful act, said:

"* * * when considering it in connection
with n.ll the other evidence in the case bearing upon
the point [the jury might] conclude that the assumed cause was the real cause of the injury."
In the case at bar there is absolutely no evidence in the
record to corroborate the doctor's conjecture that plaintiff
was possibly suffering from a ruptured disc or that the
accident of August 9, 1951, could have caused such an injury. As pointed out in appellant's brief proof of the existence of a disc injury must come from the testimony of
skilled and professional men and the only expert who testified for plaintiff was Doctor Clegg.
Neither does Sharp v. Esso Standard Oil Co., (La.
App.), 72 So. 2d 601, support plaintiff's position. In that
case the court was not confronted with a question of proof
of the nature or existence of an injury. The question before
the court was that of causal connection. As pointed out
in appellant's brief medical evidence as to causal connection
where there is a known injury may be corroborated by lay
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testimony, and in the Esso case the court did not rely upon
the medical testimony alone but leaned heavily upon the
testimony of a number of other witnesses. Quoting from
2 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law, p. 322 the court
said:

"* * * a doctor's use of such words as
'might'') 'could', 'likely', 'possible' and 'may have',
coupled with other credible evidence * * * is
sufficient to sustain an award."
Even under what appears at first hand to be a broad holding of a Louisiana Appellate Court a doctor's speculative
testimony is not sufficient without "other credible evidence." Plaintiff does not urge that there is any credible
evidence whatsoever in the case at bar which would corroborate Doctor Clegg's testimony.
The Esso case is the only case relied upon by plaintiff
to show the sufficiency of the evidence. Counsel have not
challenged the general rule of law stated in 135 A. L. R.
516 and no attempt is made to distinguish the controlling
law in Utah which is set forth in Chief Consolidated Mining
Co. v. Salisbury, 61 Utah 66, 210 Pac. 929.
Contrary to plaintiff's suggestion we do not concede
the admissibility of the doctor's testimony as to the existence of a disc injury. Where the fact to be proved is of a
nature which must necessarily be shown exclusively by
medical testimony, evidence tending only to show possibilities should not be received. Notwithstanding this, we have
chosen on this appeal to present the more fundamental
question of sufficiency of the evidence.
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Counsel have urged that the court should not undertake
to distinguish between the language "possible" and "probable." They assert that the doctor selected the word "possible" simply because he was not certain about his diagnosis.
The impotence of this argument is apparent when the medical testimony is consulted. The doctor himself answered
that he could not say that there was "probably" but only
that there was "possibly" an injured disc (R. 65). Certainly if the medical expert distinguishes between the choice
of words the court should not be precluded from doing so.
We see no reason why the court should depart from its differentiation between that which is "likely" and that which
is merely "possible."
Plaintiff states at page 27 of his brief that "no other
cause for this nerve irritation was suggested." We are
unable to determine from this statement whether counsel
is suggesting that defendant had the burden of proving the
non-existence of a disc injury or that the existence of nerve
irritation conclusively shows a disc injury. If counsel are
suggesting the first alternative, they are clearly in error
because to require defendant to prove the non-existence of
an alleged injury would be to shift the burden of proof
from plaintiff to defendant. If counsel are suggesting the
second alternative, they can find no comfort in the record
for the proposition that irritation of the sciatic nerve indicates a disc injury. Their own medical witness, who was
employed for the purpose of testifying at the trial in preference to nine ( 9) doctors who had examined plaintiff for
actual treatments, testified that this symptom coupled with
others indicated only a possible disc injury.
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Counsel also urge at page 27 of respondent's brief that
it is immaterial what specific condition was causing the
sciatica (irritation of the sciatic nerve). This position may
have had some merit if counsel for plaintiff had not sought
to show that the nerve irritation was caused by a serious
spinal injury which would result in permanent disability.
Had plaintiff stopped with proof of the nerve irritation and
not insisted upon injecting into the case the speculation of
a spinal injury ; and had counsel not demanded that this
speculation be submitted to the jury it would have been a
different matter. As it is, the ruptured disc testimony
and the evidence of permanent disability which was based
upon the supposition of a disc injury was submitted to the
jury for their speculation and this cannot be considered by
an appellate court as harmless or immaterial.
(b)

The evidence is not sufficient to show a
causal connection between the accident and
the alleged disc injury.

A careful reading of respondent's brief reveals that
respondent does not challenge the proposition urged by
appellant that the evidence is insufficient to show a causal
connection between the accident and the alleged disc injury.
We do not question the authorities cited by counsel.
As a matter of fact we have not urged on this appeal that
the evidence was insufficient to show that plaintiff may
have sustained some damage as a result of the accident.
Still, there was absolutely no evidence that the accident
caused a disc injury. While we do not contend that plain-
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tiff's evidence failed to show any damage, we do submit
that the jury should not have been allowed to speculate on
the spinal injury.
Certainly it cannot be questioned that the amount of
the verdict might well have been different had the jury
been instructed that there was not sufficient evidence upon
which to conclude that Moore was suffering from a disc
injury. (Respondent has not questioned this.) The jury
likely placed great weight on the doctor's illustration and
explanation of the injury and his speculation that Moore
was possibly suffering from the same. The jurors would
likely have totally rejected plaintiff's claim of permanent
disability had they been properly instructed because the
doctor said that the diagnosis of permanent disability was
based on the supposition of a disc injury (R. 82. See also
R. 67).
We submit that the failure to grant defendant's requested Instruction No. 16 was prejudicial error.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN GIVING INSTRUCTION
NO. 12.
Counsel for plaintiff have made no contention in their
brief that Instruction No. 12 given by the trial court is
material to any issue in this case. Authority is cited, however, for the proposition that this instruction properly
stated the substantive law. It is elementary that an instruction is not justifiably given simply because it properly
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states a rule of law. The Supreme Court of Utah deciding
this precise question said in Parker v. Bamberger, 100 Utah
361, 116 P. 2d 425, 430:

"* * * it is error for the trial court to give
an instruction, though such an instruction correctly
states the law, on a matter extraneous the issues
and evidence of the case."
This statement of the law finds support in the decisions of
numerous other courts. See 88 C. J. S. 967-69 .

•

Plaintiff reasons that State Workmen's Compensation
Laws are not a form of insurance because there is a "great
bulk of litigation in connection with the right of injured
employees to recover under the Workmen's Compensation
Laws * * *" and that therefore the authorities relating
to evidence of insurance and non-insurance are not in point.
This argument is so untenable that it defeats itself. Although we have not endeavored to count the pages of the
Decennial Digest dealing with insurance law we suggest
that there is also a great bulk of litigation arising out of
insurance contracts. Our statutes provide that employers
must secure compensation to their employees (a) by "insuring" with the State Insurance Fund, or (b) by "insuring" with certain private insurance organizations or (c)
by self-insurance of the employer (35-1-46 U. C. A., 1953).
Liability does not depend upon fault but follows from a
showing of injury or death arising out of or in the course
of employment. This being so, workmen's compensation
payments are in the same category as proceeds of insurance contracts.
At page 41 of respondent's brief counsel have attempted to set forth the legal objections to evidence of
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insurance coverage. Reference is· made in the argument
to cases dealing with evidence of insurance or non-insurance of the defendant and counsel assert that the same
reasons for rejecting the evidence in those situations do
not apply in the instant case. The case at bar does not
involve either situation discussed in respondent's brief for
this is a case where counsel sought to and succeeded in
informing the jury of non-insurance of the plaintiff. The
case of Lee v. O-smundson, 203 Minn. 487, 289 N. W. 63,
cited by appellant rules that such evidence "can serve but
one purpose" and that to allow the admission of the same
is prejudicial error.
Plaintiff's request for this instruction and the giving
of the same had the effect of an appeal to the passions of
the jury. Whether evidence relating to insurance is calculated to incite prejudice against the defendant (as in the
situation discussed by counsel for plaintiff) or sympathy
in favor of the plaintiff (as in the case at bar) its admission is prejudicial. Had this information come to the jury
as a casual or inadvertent allusion to non-insurance (lack
of workmen's compensation) the situation would be different. Here, however, the information came to the jury
in the form of written instructions from the trial judge at
the instance and request of counsel for plaintiff.
In justification for the instruction it is contended that
it was necessary to dispel in the minds of the jury the
possible false impressions that plaintiff had pursued the
wrong remedy or that he had an additional remedy. The
jury, of course, was instructed that plaintiff was entitled
to recover if defendant was guilty of actionable negligence
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and in the face of such instructions it seems inconceivable
that the jury would surmise that plaintiff had pursued
the wrong remedy in bringing his action under the F. E.
L. A. Counsel's apprehension that the jury might believe
plaintiff to have an additional remedy under the compensation act is certainly not a justifiable reason for giving
the instruction. Evidence that a plaintiff or defendant
may have a remedy against an insurance company on an
insurance contract is wholly immaterial and irrelevant to
the issues of the case and is held prejudicial to the adverse
party when received in evidence.
Counsel rely on Bruner v. McCarthy, 105 Utah 399,
142 P. 2d 649 to support their argument that Instruction
No. 12 was not prejudicial. A careful reading of that decision will reveal that the facts involved there bear no similarity whatsoever to the case at bar and the holding does
not in any particular support the proposition for which
the case is cited.

POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 13.
Plaintiff singles out two lines of testimony from his
cross-examination and asserts that the two questions propounded constituted "* * * an attempt to revive the
doctrine of assumption of risk under a new guise * * *"
This is an unfounded afterthought on the part of counsel for
plaintiff. No assertion was made at trial that the testimony
sought to be elicited was not material to the issues of the
case. There is no indication in the evidence or pleadings
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that assumption of risk was relied on as a possible defense
to the action.
The court's Instruction No. 22 referred to by plaintiff
was directed only to the issue of contributory negligence.
Since nothing was said by court, counsel, or the witnesses from which the jury might infer that plaintiff by
law must be considered to have assumed the risks created
by his employer's negligence Instruction No. 12 was wholly
foreign to the issues of the case.
In the Bruner case referred to by plaintiff this court
held that such an instruction was improper but not prej udicial. In that case, however, defendant was found to be
negligent as a matter of law.
We think that under the facts of this case the decision
of the Nebraska Supreme Court in Ellis v. Union Pacific
R. Co., 148 Neb. 515, 27 N. W. 2d 921, is controlling. In
that case, where a similar instruction on assumption of
risk was given, the Court said:
"Assumption of risk is an affirmative defense.
In the case at bar it was not made an issue either
by the pleadings or the evidence. Therefore it had
no relation to the issues in the case and should not
have been given."
Under the facts of the Ellis case the improper instruction
was held prejudicial error.
POINT IV.
THE JURY'S VERDICT WAS SO EXCESSIVE
UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS
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CASE AS TO INDICATE THAT· THE JURY
WAS INFLUENCED BY PASSION AND PREJUDICE.
Counsel for plaintiff preface their argument under
this section with the statement:
"The sole claim [of appellant] is that the
amount of the verdict in view of the evidence of injury and damage established that the jury was influenced by passion and prejudice."
This, of course, is not true because the entire argument
of appellant under Point II is directed to the proposition
that the giving of Instruction No. 12 was calculated to and
had the effect of arousing the sympathy and passion of the
jury in favor of plaintiff and against defendant. The excessive verdict could very likely be the result of instruction No. 12.
Again it would be unduly burdensome to the reader
(and perhaps improper in a reply brief) to point out all
of the statements of counsel relating to Moore's injuries
which we feel are unjustified by the record. We cite a
single exan1ple as typical of counsel's infractions in this
regard. Plaintiff asserts at pages 54-55 of his brief that
the following statement made in appellant's brief is not
supported by the evidence.
" 'In May of 1953, Moore went to work for the
Cater Construction Co. and worked ten and one-half
hours per day at least five days per week doing extremely heavy manual labor (hauling and setting
poles) and yet never complained about his back (Ex.
9, R. 317).'"
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Commenting on this respondent says :
"The foregoing statement is contrary to the
evidence most favorable to Moore which is, that he
was unable to work steady because of his back condition, and that during an ordinary work week he
would work two or three days and lay off a few
days (R. 149, 150) ."
With regard to this matter the record shows the following:
On direct examination Moore testified as follows:
R. 48
"Q.

"A.

When did you next work?
I wor~ed for Cater Construction Company.

*

*

*

*

"Q. What was the occasion of your ceasing to
work for that company?
"A. He let me go on account of I could not be
steady."

On cross-examination he testified :
R. 127, 128
"Q. Did you work steady from the time you
started with the Cater Construction Company until
you quit?
"A. No.

In July, well, how many days would you
average a week?
"A. Well I don't know what the average would
"Q.

be.''
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R. 130
"Q. Now, Mr. Moore, I have here what purports to be time slips of the Cater Electrical Construction Company, Incorporated, appearing to bear
your signature, and I refer you to second line of a
slip dated May 9, bearing the name of 'A. R. Moore',
is that your signature?"

These time slips were identified, offered and received in
evidence as Exhibit 9 (R. 135) and will show the exact
hours worked by Moore. The cross examination then proceeded:
"Q. Most of those occasions when you worked
through from Monday until Friday and Saturday,
you worked ten hours, and more, a day, did you not?
"A. Yes."

R. 137
"Q. Well, you still want to testify that you
didn't work steady during the months of May and
June, 1953, for Cater Construction Company?"

(Objection-discussion.)
"Q.

Well, all right can you answer the ques-

tion?
"A.

'Steady' is every day of the week.
"Q. In other words what you consider steady
work is Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday,
Friday, Saturday and Sunday?
'
"A. On that job."

R. 137
"Q.

* * * Did you at any time tell the

Cater Construction people that you were having difficulty with your back because of an injury you had
sustained while working for the railroad?
"A. I don't believe I did."
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In the face of this testimony counsel for respondent urge
that the evidence shows that Moore during an ordinary
work week would work two or three days and lay off a
few days. To support this statement they cite pages 149
and 150 of the record. The only evidence on those pages
relating to the number of days per week worked by Moore
en the Cater Construction Co. job was the following:
"Q. Would it be true, then, Mr. Moore, that,
in September of 1953, rather than working just two
or three days a week, you worked 123 hours at $1.50
an hour, and 341;2 hours at $1.75 an hour?
"A. I don't know whether that is correct or
not.
"Q. Would you say it isn't?
"A. I wouldn't say it wasn't correct."

This testimony hardly supports plaintiff's direct contradiction of defendant's statement of the evidence relating to
the Cater Construction Company job. Other statements
rr1ade by plaintiff in the account of the evidence seem to us
equally misleading and erroneous.
That Moore was suffering from a serious disabling
injury is conclusively rebutted by evidence of his physical
activities to the effect that within a short time after the
accident he cut and put up his own hay; went elk hunting
on a pack trip two times; rode horses in the care of his
sheep; boxed; danced; enaged in a calf-roping and bulldogging contest and pursued such employment as truck
driving, hauling and setting poles, and rolling and chopping
logs.
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We are confident that a solicitous reading of the testimony in this case will reveal that the amount of damages
awarded is grossly disproportionate to Moore's loss.

CONCLUSION
The jury was allowed to consider in assessing damages
the medical speculation of plaintiff's witness; they were
instructed in effect that unless their verdict compensated
plaintiff for his alleged injuries he would have no remuneration ; the court instructed on an issue foreign to the
case tending to convey to the minds of the jurors that the
law favors an injured worker over his employer, and the
result was an excessive verdict. These errors and each of
them constituted a clear denial of justice.
We believe that under these circumstances the defendant should have a fair opportunity to go to the jury in
this case. The law affords that right to litigants under our
system of jurisprudence and we submit that application
cf the law in this case requires a reversal of the judgment
below.
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